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How Immigration Grease Is Affected by Economic, Institutional 
and Policy Contexts: Evidence from EU Labor Markets* 
 
Theoretical arguments and previous country-level evidence indicate that immigrants are more 
fluid than natives in responding to changing labor shortages across countries, skill-groups or 
industries. The diversity across EU member states enables us to test this hypothesis across 
various institutional, economic and policy contexts. Drawing on the EU LFS and EU SILC 
datasets we study the relationship between residual wage premia as a measure of labor 
shortages in different skill-industry-country cells and the shares of migrants and natives 
working in these cells. We find that immigrants’ responsiveness to labor market shortages 
exceeds that of natives in the EU15, in particular in member states with higher 
unemployment rates, higher levels of (recent) immigration, and more open immigration and 
integration policies; but also those with barriers to citizenship acquisition or family 
reunification. Whereas higher welfare expenditures seem to exert a lock-in effect, a 
comparison across different types of welfare states indicates that institutional 
complementarities neutralize that effect. 
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Immigrant mobility is viewed as a vehicle of labor market adjustment that may help 
economies to adjust to sectoral shifts, demographic changes, or other shocks due to external 
factors (see e.g. Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2016, or Ritzen and Zimmermann, 2014). In 
segmented labor markets with low labor mobility, adjustment to such shocks is sluggish, and 
shortages and redundancies abound. An inflow of immigrant workers into sectors suffering 
labor or skill shortages, and their outflow from declining sectors, may offer an effective 
mechanism through which such imbalances are reduced.  
Labor shortages reflect imperfect or sluggish adjustment to changes in the labor market, 
resulting in economic costs of non-trivial magnitude. Lucifora and Origo (2002) estimate 
these costs in the short-run and long-run, as well as the direct and indirect costs of skill 
shortages in a set of European countries in the late 1990s, and conclude that costs generated 
by skill gaps average around 7% of GDP. A number of other studies have found that skill 
shortages negatively affect labor productivity, for example when firms fill jobs with over- or 
under-skilled workers, or do not fill them at all (Tang and Wang 2005; Bennet and 
McGuinness 2009; Quintini 2011). An important consequence of skill shortages is the impact 
on wages, as firms may be forced to raise wages in order to attract relatively scarce skilled 
labor. The shortage of high-skilled workers might decrease the innovation potential in the 
economy. If shortages lead to wage increases in selected sectors, this can result in widened 
wage differentials across skills levels and larger inequalities (Lucifora and Origo, 2002; 
Neugart and Schömann, 2002). 
The theoretical argument outlined by Borjas (2001) proposes that immigrants are more 
responsive to changing labor shortages than natives. If we conceptualize the costs of labor 
mobility as including the costs of parting with the region, occupation, or sector of origin, 
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requalification and overcoming institutional barriers, then for immigrants, unlike natives, 
some costs are sunk. As a result, labor and skill shortages, and the resulting wage premia, 
should influence immigrants' decision as to where to locate in the destination country more 
than they influence natives. Existing studies have confirmed this outcome in the US labor 
market (Borjas, 2001) and the UK (Dustmann, Frattini and Preston, 2012).  
Anderson and Ruhs (2008) argue that the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages can 
differ across different groups of workers, sectors and occupations. They propose that 
immigrants’ responsiveness to labor shortages may differ across country contexts. This 
paper’s main contribution to the literature is that we explore the diversity across EU member 
states to study how immigrants’ relative responsiveness to labor shortages varies across 
institutional contexts. We ask two key questions. First, are immigrants more, or less, 
responsive than natives to labor shortages in EU labor markets? Second, under what 
economic, institutional or policy contexts do immigrants respond to labor market shortages 
more (and under what less) fluidly than the natives?  
We study these questions using the EU Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS) in combination with 
the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) as our main sources of data. 
Due to the relatively low numbers of immigrants residing in the EU member states that joined 
the EU in 2004, 2007 and 2013, we limit our sample to the EU15 countries. 1 Our empirical 
strategy expands on that used by Borjas (2001) and Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2012), 
which we amend to study the effect of economic, institutional and policy contexts on how 
immigrants, relative to natives, respond to labor and skill shortages.2 In particular we test 
how responsiveness to labor shortages differs with respect to GDP level, unemployment rate, 
                                                          
1 Including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. 
2 See also Guzi et al., 2014. 
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the generosity of welfare spending, immigrant integration programs, openness to admitting 
immigrant workers, migration rate and the scale of recent immigration.   
We proceed as follows. In the following section we introduce the theoretical model. We then 
develop a measure of labor and skill shortages and an empirical framework evaluating the 
average responsiveness of immigrants, relative to natives, to such shortages. In the next step 
we report the results of the baseline finding and measure the variation in immigrants’ 
responsiveness to labor and skill shortages across various contexts. Finally, we discuss the 
results and their policy implications, and conclude. 
 
2. Theoretical model 
To understand EU natives and immigrants' location decisions, we develop a theoretical model 
in the spirit of Borjas (2001). Consider an initial allocation of EU natives and immigrants 
across the EU member states C and skill-industry groups K. Denote 𝑊kc the wage that a 
worker in group 𝑘 ∈ 𝐾 earns in country 𝑐 ∈ 𝐶. For simplicity we assume that requalification 
or any other adjustment costs 𝐴𝑘𝑐 pertaining to skill-industry group k and country c are fixed 
and equal for all individuals, and that 𝑊𝑘𝑐 is net of any such costs.  
The decision about mobility in the labor market is formalized first for an EU native and then 
for a foreign worker. An EU native worker considers moving from her initial country 𝐶0 and 
skill-industry group 𝐾0 to another member state or skill-industry group if  
0 < 𝐼 = max𝑐∈𝐶,𝑘∈𝐾(𝑊𝑘𝑐) −𝑊𝐾0𝐶0 − 𝐷,        (1) 
where D measures the costs of parting with their country or skill-industry group of origin, 
𝐾0 and 𝐶0, and includes any pecuniary costs of out-migration, but also non-pecuniary 
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psychological costs related to the disutility of separation from social, professional or family 
networks, which are for simplicity's sake assumed to be fixed.  
It follows that whenever 𝐷 > 0 there is room for variation in wages 𝑊𝑘𝑐 across countries and 
among native workers with the same human capital, and hence inefficient allocation of 
natives across countries and skill-industry groups. We assume that the distribution of capital 
is sticky, and hence capital movement generally does not eliminate wage differentials across 
countries and natives with the same human capital.  
The decision for immigrant workers from outside the EU to come to the EU is governed by  
𝐼 = max𝑐∈𝐶,𝑘∈𝐾(𝑊𝑘𝑐) −𝑊𝐾𝐹𝐶𝐹 − (𝐷 + 𝐵𝑐),       (2) 
where 𝑊𝐾𝐹𝐶𝐹 denotes the immigrant's wage in their non-EU country of origin, and  
𝐵𝑐 denotes their migration costs reflecting the institutional, legal or labor market barriers 
specific to country c that are borne solely by immigrants. Such costs include any restrictions 
stipulated in their work or residence permits, or related to their foreign citizenship, limiting 
their job or geographic mobility in the EU. These costs depend on economic, institutional or 
policy variables characterizing host labor markets. For example, transferability of residence 
and work rights and qualifications within and across EU member states facilitates 
immigrants’ responsiveness to wage incentives. Similarly, transferability of rights to social 
welfare services probably has a positive effect, too. These effects are compounded if they 
also concern family members. Immigration policy may also affect immigrants’ 
responsiveness if the selection of immigrants upon entry affects observed or unobserved costs 
of future migration. On the other hand, policies and institutions that restrict migrants to 
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certain regions, countries or jobs, or restrict the transferability of their rights and human 
capital tend to limit their responsiveness to wage differentials.3  
We assume that immigrants move to the EU for economic reasons only if 𝐼 > 0, i.e. the wage 
increment resulting from their immigration to the EU compensates for the costs of 
migration.4 Furthermore, among the countries and skill-industry groups available in the EU, 
the model assumes that immigrants choose the one offering the highest wage.5  An important 
implication of this model is that immigrants should be more sensitive to wage differentials 
across EU countries and skill-industry groups than the natives of those countries. This is 
because immigrants in the EU have already arrived in the EU, and hence the costs D of 
parting with their source environments are sunk for them upon arrival; these costs are still 
positive for the EU country natives. It also follows that immigrants’ sensitivity to wage 
variation should be mainly due to the locational decisions of newly arriving immigrants, since 
immigrants' sensitivity to wage differentials will decline gradually with years since 
migration, as they become attached to their destinations and skill-industry groups in a similar 
way to the natives.6  
                                                          
3 Some of these costs may affect natives as well. We assume that due to foreign citizenship or immigration 
history, such costs are larger for immigrants than natives, and without loss of generality normalize Bc to be zero 
for the natives.   
4 𝐼 > 0 does not necessarily hold for immigrants who have moved for other than economic reasons, including 
refugees or dependent migrants such as spouses or minors. We also assume that immigrants have perfect 
information about 𝐼.   
5 In reality D and requalification costs may differ across destination or source countries, skill-industry groups, or 
individuals. For example, the various languages spoken in the EU may vary in their distance from the 
immigrants' native language, and hence the cost of learning the destination country’s language may differ across 
destinations and immigrants' native languages. Although this is an important consideration, for the argument we 
develop in this section it is sufficient that costs D are sunk for immigrants, but not for comparable EU-country 
natives. The model could be straightforwardly extended to include more complex inter-temporal decisions and 
to treat wages and migration costs as stochastic variables, in which case the key relationships would hold in 
terms of expected present values. 
6 See e.g. Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann (2009) and de Palo, Faini and Venturini (2006) on immigrant 
assimilation in host societies and labor markets.  
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Our theoretical model thus implies that immigration can increase the efficiency of host labor 
markets by providing European economies with fluid labor that by improving the allocation 
of labor across countries and skill-industry groups greases the wheels of the European labor 
markets. On the other hand, this mechanism may be impeded by immigrants’ adjustment in, 
and growing attachment to host labor markets, as well as any barriers to mobility specifically 
pertaining to their immigrant status. The degree to which this occurs may interact with 
economic, institutional or policy variables characterizing the host economy. Hence, the 
responsiveness of immigrants to wage differentials (relative to the natives) under various 
economic, institutional or policy contexts is an empirical question.  
 
3. Methodology and empirical framework  
3.1 Measuring labor shortages and immigrant-native relative supply 
There are two key variables of interest in our baseline model: labor shortages and the relative 
labor supply of immigrants and natives across countries and skill-industry groups. We proxy 
labor shortages at the level of skill-industry-country cells by wage premiums, the part of 
wages that remains unexplained after compositional differences across cells are netted out. 
Specifically, a wage index pertaining to skill-industry-country cells is computed for each year 
separately using a log-wage regression of the form 
𝑊𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑘𝑐𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑘𝑐𝑡,          (3) 
where W is the log wage of worker i who belongs to skill-industry group k in country c and 
year t, X is a vector of worker i’s characteristics including gender, education, work 
experience and work experience squared, and ε is the error term. We normalize wage and all 
variables in vector X to have zero means in each year t. 𝛾𝑘𝑐𝑡 gives a vector of fixed effects for 
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skill-industry-country cells, which can be interpreted as the (adjusted) percent wage 
differential between the average wage of individuals in the particular cell and the mean wage 
for a given year in the EU (adjusted for any differences in the individual characteristics listed 
above).  
We next calculate the measure of relative supply of migrants and natives for skill-industry-
country cells. Following Borjas (2001) we define the index of relative labor supply 𝑍kct for 




,            (4). 
where 𝑀𝑘𝑐𝑡 is the number of immigrants belonging to skill-industry group k and country c in 
year t while 𝑀𝑡 is the total number of immigrants in the EU15 in year t. The denominator 
similarly indicates the relative supply of natives 𝑁𝑘𝑐𝑡 𝑁𝑡⁄  in the particular cell and year t. The 
index equals 1 when immigrants and native workers belonging to the same skill-industry 
group have the same geographic distribution. The index would be greater than one if 
immigrants in skill-industry group k were overrepresented in country c. When no immigrants 
are present in a particular group then the index equals 0. 
 
3.2 The empirical model 
Our baseline empirical framework is developed following Borjas (2001). To measure the 
relative responsiveness of immigrants to skill shortages across skill-industry-country cells we 
adopt a first-difference regression model as follows: 
∆𝑍𝑘𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝛾𝑘𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑘𝑐𝑡,        (5) 
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where the first-differenced wage index ∆𝛾𝑘𝑐𝑡 is lagged by one year, as the reaction of workers 
to labor shortages is  likely to be lagged. The model also includes group, country and year 
fixed effects, 𝛿𝑘, 𝛿𝑐 and 𝛿𝑡, respectively, which control for any specific factors that might 
change the relative supply of immigrants. In the empirical section, the model is also 
augmented with the lagged values of country-level unemployment rate and GDP growth, to 
account for variation in economic conditions between countries and over time. We estimate 
this model using the Ordinary Least Squares method. Because the observations represent 
averages at the cell level, every observation is weighted by the total number of individuals in 
the cell.7 
 
3.3 The economic, institutional and policy determinants of immigrants’ responsiveness to 
labor shortages 
To determine whether and how the responsiveness of immigrants, relative to natives, depends 
on economic, institutional and policy contexts, we augment our baseline model by allowing 
immigrants’ responsiveness to vary across countries with different contexts. Specifically, we 
adopt a variation of the first-difference model of Equation (5) as follows: 
∆𝑍𝑘𝑐𝑡 = 𝛽1∆𝛾𝑘𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽2∆𝛾𝑘𝑐𝑡−1𝜃𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝜃𝑐𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑘 + 𝛿𝑐 + 𝛿𝑡 + 𝜇𝑘𝑐𝑡,     (6) 
where 𝜃𝑐𝑡 is an indicator variable measuring the economic, institutional or policy context in 
country c and year t. This indicator variable attains value 1 when the studied context is 
present and 0 otherwise. If the underlying context variable is continuous, such as the share of 
total social expenditures in GDP, we dichotomize it by setting 𝜃𝑐𝑡 = 1 in countries whose 
average value of this variable during the studied period is above the median across all 
                                                          
7 Analytic weights (aweights in Stata) are typically appropriate when analysis is based on data containing 
averages.     
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countries, and zero otherwise. In this way the indicator identifies countries with more 
generous welfare spending.  
Adding the interaction term to the model changes the interpretation of the key coefficients. In 
a model without the interaction term, 𝛽1 can be interpreted as the direct effect of a labor 
shortage on the relative supply of immigrants. The interaction term reflects the fact that 
immigrants' responsiveness to labor shortages may be different in different contexts. Hence, 
in a model with the interaction term, the effect of a labor shortage on the relative supply of 
immigrants is not limited to 𝛽1, but is equal to 𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝜃𝑐𝑡. 𝛽1 is then interpreted as the effect 
of a labor shortage on immigrants' responsiveness when 𝜃𝑐𝑡 = 0 (e.g. in countries with below-
the-median welfare expenditures) and 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 is the effect of a skill shortage when 𝜃𝑐𝑡 = 1 
(e.g. in countries with above-the-median welfare expenditures). The introduction of 
interaction terms hence enables us to shed light on the heterogeneity of immigrants' relative 
responsiveness to labor shortages across skill-industry-country cells under different contexts.  
 
3.4 The data 
The analysis in this paper combines data from the EU-LFS and EU-SILC. Both data sets are 
representative household surveys conducted annually in all member states of the EU, and 
follow the international standard classification of economic activity (coded according to 
NACE) and occupation (coded according to ISCO). Thanks to its large sample size, the EU-
LFS provides reasonably reliable information about the share of foreign-born and native 
population across skill and industry cells in each country, although it may underestimate 
irregular migrants.8 We use the information on workers' earnings from the EU-SILC to 
                                                          
8 The EU-LFS has been used in several studies that analyze immigration in Europe, as it uniquely provides both 
cross-country and longitudinal dimensions (e.g. Dustmann and Frattini, 2011; D'Amuri and Peri, 2014). 
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measure labor shortages across skill-industry-country cells, as explained earlier. Additional 
variables, such as national GDP annual growth, GDP per capita, and total unemployment 
rate, were obtained from the World Bank (2014). Migration variables such as the annual 
inflow and stock of immigrants in the EU and the share of total social expenditure on GDP 
are taken from OECD (2014, 2015).  
The majority of immigrants in the EU are concentrated in the EU15 countries (Kahanec and 
Zaiceva, 2009), hence to ensure sufficient sample sizes, we limit our study to these countries. 
For each of the EU15 countries we partition the labor force into skill-industry-country cells 
defined by four skill levels based on the ISCO classification (see Appendix, Table A1) and 
nine industry groups based on the NACE classification (see Appendix, Table A2). This 
categorization generates 36 groups, for each of which we calculate labor shortage and the 
index of relative supply of migrants, in each country and year, which we develop to measure 
the responsiveness of migrants to identified shortages. Any cells with an insufficient number 
of respondents were dropped from the analysis. The final sample distinguishes 3,238 skill-
industry-country cells comprising all EU15 countries in the period 2004-2012.9   
We define a worker as an immigrant if he or she was born abroad. We distinguish immigrants 
born in one of the EU15 member states (but residing in another one) and those born outside 
the EU15 countries, including those born in the new EU member states (2004, 2007 and 2013 
enlargements).10 Workers born and residing in a given member state are classified as natives.  
                                                          
9 In the individual analysis, the sample is always limited to employed individuals between 20 and 60 years old. 
In each country, skill-industry groups are selected if they include at least 50 observations in the EU-LFS 
database and at least 20 observations in the EU-SILC database. Unfortunately the sample is not balanced with 
respect to country and year. In the 2004 EU-SILC dataset Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom 
are missing, and in the 2011 EU-SILC Ireland is missing. In the EU-LFS data we cannot identify the origin of 
respondents in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom in 2004, nor in Ireland during the years 2004, 2005, 
2011 and 2012.  
10 This grouping is determined by the level of detail provided in the EU-LFS datasets, where foreigners' country 
of birth is distinguished only by region. For Germany, nationality is used instead of country of birth. 
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This definition of immigrants enables us to look at and comparatively evaluate two types of 
immigrants, those from the EU15 and those from outside the EU15. However we should be 
careful when interpreting natives' mobility within EU15 countries: if a native of EU15 
country A moves to EU15 country B, her status changes from “native” to “EU15 immigrant”. 
Conversely, natives of country A returning from country B to country A switch their status 
from “EU15 immigrant” to “native”. Comparisons between non-EU15 immigrants and 
natives are therefore problematic, because some "native" moves are not counted (e.g. 
whenever natives move to another country). In effect, the changes in 𝑍𝑘𝑐𝑡 may overestimate 
the relative mobility of non-EU15 immigrants vis-à-vis native mobility. The comparison of 
EU15 immigrants with natives is less problematic, because each departure measured among 
the immigrants (natives) corresponds to an arrival measured among the natives (immigrants). 
We respond to this problem in the analysis by testing the responsiveness of non-EU15 
immigrants to labor shortages vis-à-vis the combined group of natives and EU15 immigrants. 
This approach is most directly comparable to Borjas (2001) and Dustmann, Frattini and 
Preston, (2012), as it takes the whole EU15 as the point of reference for the definition of 
immigrants and natives (i.e. similarly to “US” or “UK” in the two studies mentioned above, 
respectively).  
This research design enables us to exploit the diversity of economic, institutional and policy 
contexts across the EU15 member states and identify their role in the relative responsiveness 
of immigrants and natives to labor market shortages. Moreover, it provides for a comparative 
evaluation of EU15 immigrants and non-EU15 immigrants vis-à-vis the natives defined at the 
level of member states, as well as non-EU15 immigrants vis-à-vis the combined group of 
natives and EU15 immigrants, hence “natives” defined at the level of the EU15 as a whole.  
Such comparison provides a further test for the “immigration grease” hypothesis, studying it 
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both in the context of free mobility within the EU15 and under the mobility restrictions 
governing immigration to the EU15 from non-EU15 countries.11  
Tables A3 and A4 in the Appendix show the distribution of immigrants 𝑍 and wage index 𝑊 
across industries and skills, respectively. According to the relative supply index, immigrant 
workers are primarily concentrated in construction; transportation, accommodation and food; 
and public administration and social work; they are least concentrated in the education sector. 
In Table A4 we observe a steep skill gradient in the density of immigrants across 
occupational groups, with higher concentrations in less skilled occupations. As expected, the 
wage premium is higher in more skilled occupations. Tables A3 and A4 also show that there 
is substantial variation in Z and W across industries and occupations and over time, providing 
for identification of the key parameters 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The baseline model 
The results of the baseline model (Equation 5) are presented in Table 1.12 The dependent 
variable is the supply of immigrants relative to natives in skill-industry-country cells 
expressed in first difference. We distinguish two definitions of natives: people residing in 
their member state of birth, and those both born and residing anywhere in the EU15; we 
denote the former group of natives “MS” and the latter “MS+EU15”. We also distinguish two 
immigrant groups: immigrants born in EU15 countries and those born outside the EU15. 
                                                          
11 Year fixed effects help to account for the fact that immigration from new member states is governed by 
different rules than immigration from third countries. 
12 The first-stage model (3) yields results typical for models of that type; these are available upon request. 
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The positive estimates for labor shortage indicate that the relative supply of immigrants in a 
particular skill-industry group rose in those countries where the wage offered to that skill 
group also rose. The sensitivity of immigrant supply to wage premiums, however, differs 
across immigrant groups. In particular the coefficient for immigrants of EU15 origin, 
although positive, is not significant at the conventional levels (t-stat is 1.53). In contrast, non-
EU15 immigrants are very responsive to wage changes and the estimated coefficient can be 
interpreted in terms of the relative elasticity of supply of immigrants and natives: 𝜀 = 𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑍)
𝑑𝑙𝑛(𝑊)
. 
The wage index measures the average log-wages in each skill-industry-country cell, so that 
𝜀 = 𝛽1
𝑍
. As the mean value of Z is 1.31, the estimate in column 2 implies an elasticity of 
supply of 0.16 for non-EU15 immigrants relative to natives.13  
This key result confirming that immigrants are more responsive to labor shortages than 
natives are is robust to the inclusion of the unemployment rate and growth rate of GDP per 
capita to the model specification. The regression results reported in columns 4-6 remain very 
similar in magnitude, with the coefficient for non-EU15 immigrants becoming slightly less 
significant and the coefficients for EU15 immigrants becoming somewhat more significant.14 
In our further analysis we proceed with this more general specification. 
 
                                                          
13 Borjas (2001) estimates an elasticity of 1.3 for new immigrants in the US. In the UK, the estimates for new 
immigrants imply an elasticity of 2 (Dustmann et al 2012). Our estimates for recent immigrants introduced in 
Table 4 imply an elasticity of 0.18. The relative supply elasticities tend to be more positive for men than for 
women. The implied elasticity from the regression re-estimated in a sample of all males is 0.29, which is 
consistent with the hypothesis that male migration is mostly labor migration.  
14 The relative supply of immigrants attains maximum values of 193 and 21 for the supply of immigrants from 
EU15 and non-EU15 origins, respectively. Not surprisingly the index is the highest in Luxembourg, which has 
the largest share of immigrants in the EU, of whom more than 80% are of EU15 origin (based on EU-LFS). We 
replicate the analysis based on a sample without Luxembourg to confirm the robustness of our findings. Both 
estimated coefficients obtained for EU15 immigrants are lower than in the baseline model (Table 1 columns 1 
and 4) and not significant at the conventional level (coefficients equal to 0.13 with t-stats of 1.35). The estimates 
for non-EU15 immigrants remain essentially the same and retain their significance. These results are available 
from the authors upon request. 
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Table 1: Immigrant responsiveness to labor shortages (baseline model) 
Immigrants EU15   non-EU15   non-EU15   EU15   non-EU15   non-EU15   




MS     MS 
 
MS+EU15 
              (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6)     
Labor shortage 0.198     0.209 **  0.197 **  0.204 *   0.186 **  0.175 *   
             (0.129)     (0.088)     (0.087)     (0.121)     (0.092)     (0.091)     
GDP growth                                             0.009     0.013 **  0.013 **  
                                                         (0.008)     (0.005)     (0.005)     
Unemployment  rate                                             -0.002     -0.013 *** -0.013 *** 
                                                         (0.006)     (0.004)     (0.004)     
R2           0.017     0.048     0.049     0.017     0.06     0.061     
N            2452     2452     2452     2452     2452     2452     
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC, EU-LFS, and WDI data.  
Notes: The dependent variable is the supply of immigrants relative to natives in the particular 
skill-industry-country group expressed in first difference. MS stands for “member state”, 
referring to the level of definition of natives. The labor shortage for the same group is also 
expressed in first difference. All variables are lagged and models include cell, year and 
country fixed effects. All regressions are weighted by the number of observations for the 
skill-industry-country group in year t. Standard errors are in parentheses, *,**,*** identify 
significance at 10, 5, 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
 
The significant estimate in Table 1 for the influence of unemployment rate for immigrants of 
non-EU15 origin implies that relative to the natives, immigrants are more sensitive to labor 
market conditions in a given country. As unemployment in the country increases, the 
immigrant labor force declines relative to the native labor force, and vice versa. The estimate 
for GDP is also positive and significant, implying that economic changes tend to influence 
the supply of non-EU15 immigrants more than that of the natives. These effects are of the 
same signs but statistically insignificant for immigrants of EU15 origin. These results provide 
further support for the hypothesis that immigrants respond to market incentives and 
opportunities more fluidly than natives.  
The theoretical model developed above does not provide unequivocal predictions as to 
whether EU15 or non-EU15 immigrants should be expected to be relatively more fluid, since 
for EU15 immigrants (who enjoy free movement within the EU but whose migration spells 
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tend to be longer than among non-EU15 immigrants) costs B are likely to be small, but costs 
D high. Our empirical results suggest that the lock-in effect of D may outweigh the benefits 
of lower B, as the effects for EU15 immigrants are statistically less significant than those for 
immigrants from outside the EU15 countries. That the coefficients in columns 3 and 6 are 
slightly smaller than those in columns 2 and 5, respectively, supports our expectation that 
measuring natives at the level of member states underestimates the mobility of natives 
measured at the EU15 level.  
One important concern with the interpretation of our results is the direction of causality, for 
example in a situation when the inflow of immigrants affects wages in the local market. The 
specification of our model includes lagged variables to partly mitigate this problem. 
Dustmann et al (2012) argue that if immigrants increase the relative supply of labor in a given 
skill group, this should cause wages to go down for that group and therefore the estimated 
coefficients can be interpreted as a lower bound. 
 
4.2 The behavior of immigrants during the Great Recession and under different economic 
contexts 
An implication of the theoretical model corroborated by our baseline results presented above 
is that the immigrant workforce serves as a cushion against economic shocks, and that 
migrants are the first to move if economic conditions deteriorate. To shed light on this 
hypothesis we test the effect of the Great Recession (started in 2008) on the responsiveness of 
migrants to labor shortages using the model in Equation 6. We construct a crisis indicator 𝜃𝑐𝑡 
that takes value 1 in crisis years identified by a lower GDP level (expressed in the constant 
PPP prices per capita) relative to the year preceding the crisis, and value 0 in non-crisis years. 
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Table A5 in the Appendix documents that all countries in the EU15 experienced a period of 
crisis, although variation exists between them as to the timing and duration of the crisis.   
The results reported in Table 2 confirm that the main parameters remain virtually unchanged 
compared to the baseline model, even if their statistical significance is somewhat lower. The 
estimates imply that immigrants, especially those of non-EU15 origin, remained more 
flexible than the EU15 countries' native populations during the recession period. 
Table 2: Immigrant responsiveness to labor shortages during the Great Recession 
Immigrants EU15   non-EU15   non-EU15   
Natives MS     MS 
 
MS+EU15 
   (1)     (2)     (3)     
Labor shortage in no-crisis years (β1) 0.248 *   0.177 *   0.168 *   
    (0.133)     (0.098)     (0.097)     
Labor shortage in crisis years  (β1+β2 ) 0.111 
 








 r2           0.017     0.06     0.061     
N            2452     2452     2452     
 Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC, EU-LFS, and WDI data.  
Note: See notes to Table 1.  
 
It might be, however, that the relationship between responsiveness to labor shortages and the 
level of economic development is more resilient, reflecting a country's long-term level of 
economic development rather than relatively short-term events such as the Great Recession. 
We therefore introduce dummy variables and interaction terms to test how responsiveness to 
labor shortages differs with respect to GDP level, unemployment rate and the generosity of 
welfare spending. We estimate three separate models with dummy variables indicating 
whether a country has an above- median level of GDP, unemployment rate, or share of total 
social expenditure in GDP in the studied period (𝜃𝑐𝑡 = 1; zero otherwise). This way we pick 
up long-term differentials between the countries rather than short-term variation in these 
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variables. Table A6 in the Appendix illustrates the partition of countries according to these 
variables and shows that economic conditions in the EU15 are diverse and that each of these 
three economic variables pick up unique dimensions of their economic development.  
Our results, reported in Table 3, confirm those from the previous section, as the effect of 
labor shortage does not differ between economically weaker and stronger countries, as 
measured by GDP per capita. On the other hand, the effect of labor shortage on the 
responsiveness of non-EU15 immigrants in countries with above-median unemployment rates 
is statistically significant, with a coefficient of 0.33; this is almost double that found in the 
baseline model and about double the coefficient in countries with below-median 
unemployment rates. This finding is remarkable, as it indicates that immigrants respond 
particularly fluidly to labor shortages in the countries that need such response the most.  
The findings reported in Table 3 further imply that non-EU15 immigrant workers are more 
responsive to labor market shortages in countries that are less generous in terms of total 
social expenditure relative to GDP.15  This result is in line with the notion that higher welfare 
expenditures may increase immigrants' reservation wages or offer them other attractive 
options through active labor market policy programs, locking them into their existing status 







                                                          




Table 3: Immigrant responsiveness to labor shortages, by economic conditions  
Immigrants EU15   non-EU15   non-EU15   
Natives MS     MS 
 
MS+EU15 
              (1)     (2)     (3)     
Low GDP countries (β1) 0.17     0.217     0.214     
             (0.113)     (0.166)     (0.167)     





   (0.233)   (0.091)   (0.086)   
Low unemployment rate countries (β1) 0.277     0.161 *   0.145 *   
 
(0.227)     (0.089)     (0.086)     
High unemployment rate countries (β1+β2 ) 0.141 
 
0.333 ** 0.328 ** 
 
(0.154)   (0.164)   (0.164)   
Low social expenditure countries (β1) 0.2     0.37 *** 0.352 *** 
 
(0.265)     (0.135)     (0.134)     





   (0.136)   (0.118)   (0.117)   
Source: Based on EU-SILC, EU-LFS, and WDI data.  
Note: See note to Table 1. The results from interactions are estimated from three separate 
regressions based on the average level of GDP per capita (in PPP constant prices), 
unemployment rate, and total social expenditure over the studied period. 
 
4.3 Immigration history and policy 
European countries differ greatly as to the characteristics of their immigrant population and 
their immigration policy. In this section we test how the relative responsiveness of 
immigrants to labor shortages is affected by the scale of immigration, the rate of recent 
immigration, and the openness of the country's immigration policy. We calculate the scale of 
immigration as the share of foreign-born individuals in the working age population using data 
from the EU-LFS. The rate of recent immigration is determined from OECD statistics as the 
ratio of cumulative immigrant inflow during the period 2004-2012 to the total immigrant 
population in 2012. The openness of immigration policy determines the costs of immigration 
and therefore the type of migrants who enter the country, and hence may affect their 
responsiveness to labor market shortages. We use a measure developed by Ruhs (2011), who 
constructs an index of openness to admitting immigrant workers, as of 2009. These variables 
are described in Tables A6 and A7 in the Appendix. We split the countries into two groups, 
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with the median as the threshold, and introduce interaction variables with the labor shortage 
variable as in the previous sections.  
Our findings, presented in Table 4, show that immigrants are more responsive than natives to 
labor shortages in high-immigration countries. This may suggest that a larger immigrant 
population encourages greater mobility among the immigrant workforce and lower migration 
or adjustment costs, by more effectively transmitting information about the economic 
environment. Our estimates further imply that immigrants are more responsive to labor 
shortages in countries with relatively more recent immigration.16  This finding corroborates 
the notion developed in the theoretical section of this paper that fresh immigrants are 
expected to be more responsive to the changing economic environment than those who 
moved longer ago. In spite of positive point estimates, the flexibility of immigrants of EU15 
origin does not statistically differ from that of natives, across countries with varied recent 
migration experiences.  
The results reported in Table 4 further confirm that more open immigration programs are 
advantageous for both EU15 and non-EU15 immigrants, as measured by their mobility in the 
labor market relative to natives.17 The magnitude of effect in immigrant-friendly labor 
markets for non-EU15 immigrants, the group directly affected by the immigration policies, is 
significant and positive; and very similar to the estimate obtained from the baseline model. 
Our estimates further imply that immigrants of EU15 origin are particularly responsive to 
labor shortages relative to natives in countries that operate more open labor immigration 
policies. A possible explanation of this strong effect for EU15 immigrants could be that 
increased competition from non-EU15 immigrants makes EU15 immigrants more responsive 
                                                          
16 The group of countries with high migration rates includes Austria, Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. The group with high recent immigration includes Austria, Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and Sweden.  
17 The group with open migration policies includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom. 
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to labor market opportunities in states that are more open to immigration from non-EU15 
origins. 
Table 4: Immigrant responsiveness to labor shortages in the immigration context 
Immigrants EU15   non-EU15   non-EU15   
Natives MS     MS 
 
MS+EU15 
              (1)     (2)     (3)     
Low migration rate (β1) 0.249 *   0.11     0.102     
             (0.128)     (0.135)     (0.135)     
High migration rate (β1+β2 ) 0.157 
 
0.265 ** 0.251 ** 
  (0.241)   (0.125)   (0.123)   
Low recent immigration (β1) 0.197     0.062     0.045     
 
(0.278)     (0.167)     (0.168)     
High recent immigration (β1+β2 ) 0.208 
 
0.266 ** 0.259 ** 
 
(0.146)   (0.105)   (0.103)   
Restricted migration policy  (β1) -0.145     0.149     0.154     
 
(0.140)     (0.178)     (0.178)     
Open migration policy (β1+β2 ) 0.311 ** 0.21 ** 0.194 ** 
  (0.124)   (0.098)   (0.098)   
Source: Based on EU-SILC, EU-LFS, WDI and Ruhs (2011) data. 
Note: See note to Table 1. Migration variables are described in Tables A6 and A7.  
 
4.4 Immigrant integration policies 
The theoretical model developed above implies that institutions and policies lowering the 
costs of adjustment, requalification, or occupational mobility should, in general, increase 
workers' responsiveness to skill shortages, although lock-in effects may set in with time spent 
in the destination. Indeed, Ruhs (2011) argues that various barriers prevent immigrants from 
switching jobs, obtaining permanent residence or reuniting with their families; all of these 
hinder their professional mobility and career advancement. In this section we evaluate the 
impact of national integration policies on immigrants’ responsiveness to labor shortages 
using the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), constructed in 2010. This index is 
based on a wide range of 148 policy sub-indicators determined on the basis of expert surveys 
(Huddelston et al., 2011) and consistently measures the quality of integration policies across 
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the EU. The sub-indicators are summarized as an overall score in seven fields: labor market 
mobility, family reunion, education, long-term residence, political participation, access to 
citizenship, and anti-discrimination.  
We apply a similar approach to that used in the previous sections, introducing interactions of 
the labor shortage variable with an indicator variable that equals 1 for countries with a 
favorable integration policy (as before, the median score defines a threshold) and 0 otherwise. 
Table A8 in the Appendix shows each country's MIPEX score, and the figures in bold 
indicate values above the median in the respective category. The quality of legislation 
towards immigrants differs to a great extent, both across the countries and between the 
categories. Only two countries (Sweden and Portugal) operate favorable policies in all seven 
categories (see Table A8).  
The results reported in Table 5 for each group of immigrants and natives confirm that 
immigrants from non-EU15 origins are generally more responsive to labor shortages than 
natives in countries with favorable integration policies. This is also confirmed by the 
interaction term with the overall MIPEX index, which bears a positive and significant 
coefficient in countries with above-median quality integration policies, but an insignificant 
coefficient in countries with unfavorable policies. 
There are a few notable exceptions, however. In countries with less developed family or 
education integration programs, immigrants remain more responsive to labor shortages than 
natives, which may seem counterintuitive. However, this result may also indicate that better 
integration policies assimilate immigrants into host societies such that they are more strongly 
tied to their host environment and thus behave more similarly to natives. In effect, although 
better integration policies may lower some of the costs of migration (e.g. recognition of 
qualifications), they may increase others (e.g. the psychological costs of leaving a familiar 
24 
 
environment and social networks). These effects are consistent with the notion that 
integration policies lowering immigrants’ migration costs facilitate immigrants’ mobility and 
those increasing the pool of dependent immigrants or facilitating integration in local social 
networks or environments decrease their mobility.  
Similarly, legislation providing better access to citizenship keeps non-EU15 immigrants in 
their chosen location more permanently, so that they behave more like natives, whereas in 
countries with less favorable rules governing citizenship acquisition immigrants remain more 
mobile than natives. This finding is consistent with the argument above: as obtaining 
citizenship is a measure of formal integration into the host society, in countries with better 
access to citizenship migrants may be hesitant to move to another member state so as not to 
jeopardize their possibility of acquiring their host country’s citizenship. Immigrants are then 
more likely to invest in host-country-specific human and social capital, which locks them into 
their host country.   
It is interesting to observe that access to citizenship and long-term residence appear to have 
opposite effects on non-EU15 immigrants’ responsiveness to labor shortages. Whereas 
citizenship creates a lock-in effect, as we have just described, access to long-term residence 
seems to come with rights that enable immigrants to be more mobile across skill-industry 
groups and countries. Those rights may include unrestricted access to jobs, the possibility to 
leave and re-enter the country more easily, and the right to reside anywhere in the host 
country. The impact of integration policies on migrants’ responsiveness to labor shortages 
may however be of more complex nature, and further study would be needed in order to 





Table 5: Immigrant responsiveness to labor shortage under different integration programs  
Immigrants EU15   
non-
EU15   non-EU15   
Natives MS     MS 
 
MS+EU15 
              (1)     (2)     (3)     
Unfavorable overall integration (β1) 0.197     0.134     0.115     
 
(0.230)     (0.140)     (0.139)     
Favorable overall integration (β1+β2) 0.211 
 
0.245 ** 0.241 ** 
  (0.147)   (0.114)   (0.113)   
Unfavorable labor mobility   (β1) 0.053     0.099     0.084     
             (0.292)     (0.177)     (0.176)     
Favorable labor mobility (β1+β2) 0.305 ** 0.245 ** 0.236 ** 
  (0.14)   (0.1)   (0.098)   
Unfavorable family reunion (β1) 0.183     0.236 **  0.225 *   
 
(0.157)     (0.116)     (0.115)     





   (0.212)   (0.137)   (0.136)   
Unfavorable education policy (β1) 0.173     0.262 *   0.256 *   
 
(0.147)     (0.151)     (0.150)     





   (0.241)   (0.091)   (0.089)   
Unfavorable political participation (β1) 0.163     0.216     0.214     
 
(0.132)     (0.181)     (0.182)     
Favorable political participation (β1+β2) 0.233 
 
0.164 * 0.147 * 
  (0.21)   (0.085)   (0.081)   
Restricting long-term residence (β1) 0.212     0.126     0.109     
 
(0.206)     (0.129)     (0.127)     
Accessible long-term residence (β1+β2) 0.192 
 
0.267 ** 0.263 ** 
  (0.157)   (0.122)   (0.122)   
Unfavorable access to citizenship (β1) 0.169     0.345 *** 0.336 *** 
 
(0.159)     (0.131)     (0.130)     





   (0.236)   (0.128)   (0.126)   
Unfavorable anti-discrimination policy (β1) 0.117     0.237     0.225     
 
(0.250)     (0.163)     (0.161)     
Favorable anti-discrimination policy (β1+β2) 0.286 ** 0.138 * 0.127 
   (0.141)   (0.084)   (0.083)   
Source: Based on EU-SILC, EU-LFS, WDI data and MIPEX index.  
Note: See note to Table 1. Countries are divided into two groups based on the performance of 
their integration policies in each of seven areas measured by 2010 MIPEX index: labor 
market mobility, family reunion, education, political participation, long term residence, 




As intra-EU15 immigrants enjoy the benefits of free movement within the EU and an equal 
position in the labor market to that of natives – policies that may be expected to override the 
role of general integration policies – we expected integration policies to have a larger impact 
on immigrants of non-EU15 origin than on those of EU15 origin. Table 5 indeed shows that 
the responsiveness coefficients for non-EU15 immigrants are statistically significant much 
more often than for EU15 immigrants. On the other hand, there are two exceptions to this 
rule. One is that favorable policies supporting immigrants’ mobility in the labor market help 
immigrants from all origins, EU15 and non-EU15, to realize their potential and increase their 
responsiveness to labor shortages. The second is that the point estimate on immigrants’ 
responsiveness is higher and attains a higher level of statistical significance for EU15 than 
non-EU15 immigrants in countries with favorable antidiscrimination policies. These results 
imply that labor market mobility and antidiscrimination measures have more profound effects 
in the society, affecting the broader categories of immigrants.  
 
4.5 The role of welfare state institutions 
Although we show above that the size of the welfare state, measured as the share of total 
social expenditures in the country's GDP, is associated with lower immigrant mobility, 
welfare state institutions may play more complex roles in determining the responsiveness of 
immigrants and natives to labor shortages. These effects may arise through immigrants’ 
integration into welfare state institutions, and the transferability of their social welfare 
entitlements and rights, but also through the welfare state's impact on their reservation wages. 
In this context Giulietti et al (2014) show that immigrants are not particularly attracted to 
European countries with more generous welfare spending. To test how welfare state 
institutions shape the relative responsiveness of immigrants and natives to labor shortages, 
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we adapt welfare regime typology developed by Esping-Andersen (1990) and extended by 
Ferrera (1996). Essentially, we divide the EU15 member states into four groups representing 
different welfare state institutions: 
1. The continental Christian democratic welfare state, represented by Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. 
2. The Mediterranean Christian democratic welfare state, represented by Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. 
3. The social democratic (Nordic) welfare state, represented by Denmark, Finland and 
Sweden. 
4. The liberal welfare state, represented by Ireland and the United Kingdom. 
Christian democratic welfare regimes are characterized by having scaled-up efforts in recent 
years to integrate immigrants, but have varied ease of and barriers to access to their labor 
markets, with relatively easier access in the Mediterranean sub-category. The continental sub-
category is characterized by relatively high levels of immigrant segregation in the labor 
market.18 The liberal and social democratic welfare states are both characterized by high 
integration efforts at rather different levels of economic migration (high in liberal welfare 
states and low in social democratic welfare states).  
To test whether these institutional contexts have any effect on immigrant responsiveness to 
labor market shortages, we amend Equation 6 to account for the diversity of welfare states in 
the EU and estimate it including the interaction terms of labor shortage with all welfare state 
types described above. The estimates reported in Table 6 imply that only in social democratic 
welfare states and for EU15 immigrants is the (positive) estimated coefficient statistically 
                                                          
18 For a comprehensive review see Table 1 in Guzi, Kahanec and Mytna Kurekova (2014). 
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significant. In general the comparison across welfare state types does not support the 
hypothesis that more generous welfare states would exhibit lower relative immigrant 
responsiveness to labor shortages.  In fact, the estimated coefficients are lower in the liberal 
welfare states than in the other types of welfare states. Hence, whereas our results above 
show that larger spending on social expenditures relative to GDP is associated with lower 
relative immigrant responsiveness to labor shortages (see Table 3), the results reported in 
Table 6 indicate that more generous welfare states do not necessarily inhibit immigrants’ 
mobility. Rather, these results provide support for the notion that the role of the welfare state, 
and that of welfare generosity, is more complex and may be shaped by various institutional 
complementarities. 
Table 6: Immigrant responsiveness to labor shortage and the role of the welfare state 
Immigrants EU15   
non-
EU15   non-EU15   
Natives MS     MS 
 
MS+EU15 
   (1)   (2)   (3)   
Labor shortage in AT,BE,FR, DE, LU, NL 0.273     0.138     0.098     
 
(0.466)     (0.146)     (0.135)     






















 Labor shortage in IE,UK -0.94 ** -0.03 
 
0.004 
   0.366   0.233   0.225   










Since the seminal paper by Borjas (2001), immigrants have been considered a more mobile 
type of labor force, responding to imbalances more fluidly than natives. The literature has, 
however, not yet answered an important question relevant from both the academic and policy 
perspective: how robust is the notion of immigrant grease with respect to various economic, 
institutional or policy contexts?  
This paper has addressed this question in the context of the EU15, a set of countries that share 
basic characteristics (advanced liberal market democracies), but differ in many economic, 
institutional and policy variables. Looking at the EU15 using the EU LFS, EU-SILC and 
several other auxiliary datasets has enabled us to exploit this diversity and study how it 
affects the way in which immigrants and natives respond to labor market shortages.  
Our empirical strategy, based on a model similar to Borjas (2001), but augmented to account 
for economic, institutional and policy diversity across the EU15, has resulted in a key finding 
confirming that economic, institutional and policy context matter for immigrants’ relative 
responsiveness to labor market shortages.  
Specifically, our baseline finding that immigrants are at least as much and regularly more 
responsive to labor shortages than natives is robust across all the studied contexts. In 
particular, almost none of our results indicate that immigrants would be less fluid than natives 
in responding to labor shortages. Of the two negative coefficients, for liberal welfare states 
and countries with restrictive migration policy (for EU15 immigrants), only the first is 
statistically different from zero. In contrast, in a number of contexts immigrants are shown, at 




Immigrants appear to be more responsive to labor shortages in high-unemployment countries, 
and also in countries with relatively low welfare expenditures. The economic recession which 
began in 2008 had no significant impact on the responsiveness of immigrants to wage 
changes. Our results further show that countries with larger scale of immigration, higher rate 
of recent immigration, or more open migration policy exhibit significantly more fluid 
immigrant work forces than native labor forces. Immigrants are also relatively more 
responsive to labor shortages in countries with more favorable labor mobility, political 
participation, long-term residence and antidiscrimination integration policies, as measured by 
the MIPEX index. The same is true for the overall MIPEX index. On the other hand, 
immigrants are more mobile in countries with less favorable citizenship or family-reunion 
policies, which is consistent with a supposed citizenship acquisition lock-in effect and the 
stabilizing effect of dependent immigrants. 
Finally, we show that the role of the welfare state may involve various institutional 
complementarities beyond the effects of welfare generosity measured as the share of social 
expenditures in GDP. More generous welfare state types do not seem to have less-responsive 
immigrant populations than their less-generous counterparts; on the contrary, immigrants are 
more responsive to labor shortage than natives in welfare-generous social democratic welfare 
states compared to more frugal liberal welfare states. 
We also find that EU15 immigrants are similarly responsive vis-à-vis the natives as their non-
EU15 colleagues are in some contexts, but we find statistically significant positive results for 
non-EU15 immigrants in more contexts than for immigrants of EU15 origin. This indicates 
that compared to the more recent non-EU15 immigrants the lock-in effect for the EU15 
immigrants, who generally have a longer history in (and hence are more attached to) their 
host countries, outweighs the effect of free mobility that they enjoy in the EU15.   
31 
 
As for the limitations of our study, the analysis presented does not permit causal 
interpretations, since the studied economic, institutional and policy contexts cannot always be 
seen as fully exogenous. Similarly, although labor shortages are lagged by one period and are 
measured regardless of the immigrant status of workers in a cell, due to some serial 
correlation the immigrant-native relative labor supply could still affect skill premia across 
cells. However, such reverse channels can be argued to reinforce our results, as they tend to 
attenuate the studied effects (Dustmann et al., 2012).  Our study shows that the coefficient of 
labor-shortage is significantly positive in some but not all economic, institutional or policy 
contexts in the EU15. This is an important result that deserves further study. We find the role 
of the welfare state especially intriguing and this requires further quantitative and qualitative 
investigation. Our results also indicate that policies matter, and that whereas some policies 
seem to enable immigrants to respond to changing labor market conditions, others may be 
inhibiting immigrant workers’ mobility. As immigrants’ labor market mobility provides for 
the more efficient allocation of labor in host labor markets, policies that inhibit their mobility 
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Table A1 Definition of skill group 
Occupation category (ISCO-1) Skill group 
1 Legislators, senior officials and managers high 
2 Professionals high 
3 Technicians and associate professionals high 
4 Clerks intermediate general  
5 Service workers and shop and market sales workers intermediate general  
6 Skilled agricultural and fishery workers  
intermediate 
specific  
7 Craft and related workers 
intermediate 
specific  
8 Plant and machine operators and assemblers 
intermediate 
specific  
9 Elementary occupations low 
 
Table A2 Definition of industry group  
Economic activity NACE coding Industry group 
Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry C,D, E 1 
Construction F 2 
Wholesale and retail trade G 3 
Transportation and storage, accommodation and food service H,I 4 
Information and communication, financial and insurance 
activities J,K 5 
Education M 6 
Human health N 7 
Public administration, defense, and social work activities O, P, Q 8 





Table A3 The relative supply of immigrants and wage index by industry, in EU15 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Relative supply of immigrants 
      2004 1.01 1.81 0.83 1.45 0.88 0.59 0.87 1.29 0.73 
2005 1.04 1.78 0.84 1.66 0.94 0.57 0.92 1.30 0.79 
2006 1.07 1.83 0.88 1.74 0.90 0.55 1.00 1.33 0.89 
2007 1.06 1.98 0.94 1.82 0.97 0.51 0.93 1.28 0.93 
2008 1.08 1.89 0.98 1.66 1.00 0.53 0.90 1.38 0.81 
2009 1.03 1.73 0.97 1.68 0.98 0.53 0.92 1.55 0.97 
2010 1.01 1.66 0.97 1.60 0.99 0.53 0.98 1.70 0.98 
2011 0.97 1.59 0.93 1.59 1.01 0.57 0.94 1.61 0.97 
2012 0.94 1.46 0.93 1.64 1.04 0.60 0.96 1.58 1.17 
Wage index 
        2004 -0.03 -0.17 -0.17 -0.09 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.68 
2005 0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.05 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.00 -0.56 
2006 0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.06 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.01 -0.53 
2007 0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.08 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.00 -0.64 
2008 0.07 -0.05 -0.11 -0.01 0.13 0.08 0.04 0.01 -0.63 
2009 0.06 -0.06 -0.11 -0.02 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.00 -0.67 
2010 0.03 -0.09 -0.12 -0.04 0.07 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.71 
2011 0.06 -0.06 -0.14 -0.05 0.07 0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.59 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EU-LFS data. 
Note: The relative supply of immigrants is calculated as the share of non EU15 immigrants 
relative to the group “MS+EU15” (see Section 4.1). Statistics are average values for the 
EU15 countries, distinguished by nine industry groups defined in Table A2: 1 Manufacturing, 
2 Construction, 3 Wholesale and trade, 4 Transportation, accommodation and food, 5 
Communication and financial, 6 Education, 7 Health, 8 Public administration and social 





Table A4 Relative supply of immigrants and wage index by skill, in EU15 





Relative supply of immigrants 
  2004 0.65 0.97 1.12 3.30 
2005 0.70 0.99 1.21 3.17 
2006 0.68 1.05 1.26 3.41 
2007 0.65 1.08 1.31 3.60 
2008 0.63 1.10 1.36 3.63 
2009 0.61 1.09 1.33 3.97 
2010 0.62 1.06 1.28 4.29 
2011 0.61 1.06 1.24 4.11 
2012 0.64 1.07 1.21 4.09 
Wage index 
    2004 0.14 -0.14 -0.25 -0.37 
2005 0.19 -0.10 -0.15 -0.31 
2006 0.20 -0.12 -0.13 -0.32 
2007 0.20 -0.11 -0.14 -0.35 
2008 0.21 -0.10 -0.13 -0.33 
2009 0.20 -0.11 -0.15 -0.39 
2010 0.18 -0.14 -0.18 -0.39 
2011 0.19 -0.14 -0.17 -0.41 
 
Source: Own calculations based on EU-SILC and EU-LFS data. 
Note: The relative supply of immigrants is calculated as the share of non EU15 immigrants 
relative to the group “MS+EU15”. Statistics are average values for the EU15 countries, 




Table A5 The period of the Great Recession, identified by drop in GDP levels 
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
AT 39248 39918 41178 42539 42963 41181 41787 42888 43139 
BE 38446 38905 39679 40525 40602 39149 39610 39840 39494 
DE 36560 36831 38237 39540 40044 38080 39668 40980 41966 
DK 41780 42684 43988 44487 43880 41172 41558 41831 41524 
ES 31975 32566 33325 33852 33613 32040 31829 31732 31198 
FI 36067 36992 38476 40357 40287 36671 37732 38618 38047 
FR 35256 35630 36256 36856 36621 35286 35718 36264 36085 
GR 28535 29088 30593 31576 31442 30454 29035 27046 25229 
IE 44396 46081 47318 48261 46265 42874 42188 42946 42919 
IT 35602 35758 36435 36861 36194 34050 34531 34626 33715 
LU 86699 89868 92811 97410 94981 88058 89147 88848 86587 
NL 40142 40868 42187 43746 44362 42516 42944 43148 42453 
PT 25431 25581 25905 26465 26425 25632 26116 25828 25095 
SE 38128 39177 40631 41667 41090 38693 40880 41763 41840 
UK 34579 35454 36163 37113 36538 34388 34686 34800 34658 
Source: WDI 
Note: Figures in bold mark the crisis period that is identified by a drop in GDP levels 
(expressed in the constant PPP prices per capita) in comparison to the year immediately 
preceding the beginning of the crisis.   
 
Table A6 Economic conditions and immigrant population in the EU15  






Rate of recent 
immigration 
PT 10.16 9.58 23.89 0.08 0.93 
GR 10.28 12.12 22.44 0.09 0.53 
ES 10.39 14.91 23.68 0.15 0.98 
IT 10.47 7.83 26.43 0.09 0.79 
UK 10.48 6.55 22.30 0.13 0.82 
FR 10.49 8.87 30.94 0.12 0.34 
FI 10.55 7.76 27.37 0.04 0.80 
DE 10.58 7.95 26.30 0.10 0.83 
BE 10.59 7.81 27.97 0.14 0.73 
SE 10.61 7.42 28.40 0.16 0.99 
AT 10.64 4.51 27.59 0.17 0.89 
NL 10.66 4.09 22.18 0.13 1.04 
DK 10.66 5.56 28.71 0.09 0.74 
IE 10.72 8.18 19.96 0.15 0.99 
LU 11.41 4.78 22.40 0.43 0.59 
Source: EU-LFS, OECD and WDI 
Note: Reported values are average values across the period 2004-2012. GDP per capita in 
constant PPP prices and the % of unemployed in the labor force are taken from WDI. The 
share of total social expenditure on GDP is taken from OECD. Migration rate is calculated 
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from EU-LFS as the share of foreign-born individuals in the working age population. The 
share of recent migrants is calculated as the sum of immigrant inflows over the period, 
relative to the stock of immigrants in 2012, using OECD statistics. Countries are sorted by 
GDP. Figures in bold indicate values above the median in the respective category. 
Table A7 Index measuring the degree of openness to admitting immigrant workers 
Country Program Index 
AT Settlement Permit-Key Worker Migrant Programme (AUT) 0.556 
IE Work Permit Scheme (IRE) 0.569 
IT Non-Seasonal  (ITA) 0.569 
PT Residency visa (POR) 0.583 
ES General Regime (ESP) 0.625 
FI Ordinary Residence Permit (FIN) 0.639 
NL General labour scheme (NED) 0.639 
UK Tier 2-Skilled workers(General) (Points Based System) (UK) 0.653 
FR Temporary permit for tempor. work (3-12month) (FRA) 0.667 
GR Residence Permit for Regular Staff (GR) 0.667 
BE Work Permit type B (BEL) 0.694 
DK The Green Card Scheme (DEN) 0.708 
DE Settlement Permit (GER) 0.722 
SE General Work Permit Programme (SWE) 0.722 
LU  N/A N/A 
Source: Ruhs (2011) 
















AT 56 41 44 33 58 22 40 42 
IE 39 34 25 79 43 58 63 49 
GR 50 49 42 40 56 57 50 49 
FR 49 52 29 44 46 59 77 51 
DK 73 37 51 62 66 33 47 53 
UK 55 54 58 53 31 59 86 57 
DE 77 60 43 64 50 59 48 57 
LU 48 67 52 78 56 66 48 59 
IT 69 74 41 50 66 63 62 60 
ES 84 85 48 56 78 39 49 63 
BE 53 68 66 59 79 69 79 67 
NL 85 58 51 79 68 66 68 68 
FI 71 70 63 87 58 57 78 69 
PT 94 91 63 70 69 82 84 79 
SE 100 84 77 75 78 79 88 83 
Source: www.mipex.eu 
Note: Countries are sorted by the overall score. Figures in bold indicate values above the 
median in the respective category. 
